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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution prohibits the trial of an incompetent 
defendant.1  To reinforce this principle, Congress has enacted substantive 
and procedural safeguards, requiring the trial of an incompetent 
defendant to be delayed while medical treatment is administered.2  
Despite Congressional attempts to effectively implement this Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee, a crucial question is currently being debated in 
the federal circuits:3 whether the defendant bears the burden of proving 
incompetency, or, in the alternative, whether the government must 
establish competency.4  In the absence of statutory allocation,5 the 
federal circuits must be careful when determining which party bears the 
burden of proof since “where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of 
the outcome.”6 
The recognition that an incompetent defendant should not be tried 
dates back to English common-law and was included in William 
Blackstone’s seventeenth century commentaries.7  Blackstone wrote that 
if an individual, before arraignment of an offense, “becomes mad, he 
ought not be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with 
that advice and caution that he ought.”8  Blackstone further argued that if 
the individual becomes mad after pleading, “he shall not be tried: for 
how can he make his defense?”9  Thus, there are firm historical roots that 
advise against trying a defendant who is unable to comprehend and 
participate in the proceedings against him.10 
                                                                                                             
 1 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 states “nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”; Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 
437, 439 (1992) (“It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the criminal government of a defendant who is not competent to 
stand trial.”). 
 2 See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006). 
 3 See infra Part III. 
 4 See United States v. Patel, 524 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2007). 
 5 See infra Part II.A. 
 6 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). 
 7 Bruce J. Winick, Criminal Law: Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead 
Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 571, 574 (1995). Blackstone’s Commentaries have been referred to as “the 
most influential legal text in colonial America.”  Taunya Lovell Banks, Dangerous 
Woman: Elizabeth Key’s Freedom Suit – Subjecthood and Racialized Identity in 
Seventeenth Century Colonial Virginia, 41 AKRON L. REV. 799, 832 (2008). 
 8 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See Paula Siuta Eichner, Cooper v. Oklahoma and the Fundamental Right Not to 
Be Tried While Incompetent, 24 N.E.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 511, 517 (1998) (“The legal 
doctrine against the trial of an incompetent defendant is firmly rooted in English and 
American legal history.”). 
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The leading United States Supreme Court case reinforcing this 
conviction is Drope v. Missouri,11 where, writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Burger made two observations about the trial of an incompetent 
defendant.  First, Burger reasoned that the trial of an incompetent 
defendant is analogous to a trial in absentia.12  Specifically, despite an 
individual’s physical presence at the proceedings, the lack of mental 
capacity sufficient to defend oneself is equivalent to trying a defendant 
utterly absent from the hearing.13  Second, Burger explicitly asserted that 
the prohibition against trying an incompetent defendant “is fundamental 
to an adversary system of justice.”14  Ultimately, if a term of 
imprisonment is imposed upon a mentally incompetent defendant, the 
defendant’s inability to effectively understand and reflect upon such 
sentence clashes with the underlying objectives of punishment.15 
Ensuring the defendant’s competence preserves not only the accuracy but 
also the fairness, dignity and honor of the verdict, all of which form the 
cornerstone of the American judicial system.16 
Part II of this Comment reviews the federal statute that governs 
incompetency, 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  Despite its efforts to outline the 
procedures and substantive standards for determining competency, 
Congress has not explicitly allocated the burden of proof to the 
government or defendant.  Further, the legislative history of the statute 
does not clarify which party Congress intended to bear the burden of 
proof.  Part III explores two Supreme Court cases, Medina v. California17 
and Cooper v. Oklahoma,18 which address state competency standards.  
At the outset, these cases are not persuasive for the purpose of allocating 
the federal standard of proof, because their analyses are respectively 
centered upon the California and Oklahoma state competency standards, 
not 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  In addition to solely addressing state competency 
                                                                                                             
 11 420 U.S. 162, 170 (1975). 
 12 Id. at 171. 
 13 Id.; see also Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963) (“And yet 
one who is mentally deranged may be as far removed from the proceedings as if 
physically absent.”). 
 14 Drope, 420 U.S. at 171–72. 
 15 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) (delineating factors for the court to consider in 
addressing the need for a sentencing, including: “(A) to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from 
future crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner.”). 
 16 Grant H. Morris, Mental Disorder and the Civil/Criminal Distinction, 41 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1177, 1181 n.22 (2004). 
 17 505 U.S. 437 (1992). 
 18 517 U.S. 348 (1996). 
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standards, both state statutes create a presumption of competence19—a 
characteristic absent from the federal competency statute. Moreover, the 
allocation of the burden of proof in those two jurisdictions is settled.20  
Part IV reveals each circuit court’s position, if any, on which party bears 
the federal burden of proof.  Most notably, two circuits, the Fourth and 
Eleventh, have without original analysis, adopted the Supreme Court’s 
position in Cooper v. Oklahoma.  Part V offers a survey of where the 
burden of proof lies in state competency hearings. Part VI asserts that the 
substantive standards of 18 U.S.C. § 4241 embody concerns about access 
to evidence, risk of error, and fundamental fairness.  These three factors 
collectively and conclusively suggest that a potentially incompetent 
defendant should not be called upon to prove his own incompetence.  
Consequently, when the issue of competence is raised during a federal 
criminal proceeding, the Government must bear the burden of proof of 
establishing the defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Finally, Part VII 
concludes by reinforcing the consistency of the arguments advanced with 
Blackstone’s historical observations. 
II. MENTAL COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 
STATUTE AT ISSUE 
Congress codified the federal procedures governing a defendant’s 
mental competency to stand trial in 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  If concern arises 
regarding the defendant’s mental competency, the government, 
defendant’s counsel, or the court, sua sponte, may request a hearing to 
determine the defendant’s mental competency.21  This motion can only 
be made after the prosecution commences but prior to sentencing.22  In 
evaluating the motion’s basis, the court considers if “there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a 
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the 
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”23  If these 
requirements are met, the court must grant the motion for a competency 
hearing. 
At the competency hearing, a similar standard must be satisfied, 
with two exceptions: (1) the reasonable cause to believe standard of 
proof is replaced with a preponderance of the evidence standard; and (2) 
                                                                                                             
 19 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (West 1982); OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) 
(1991). 
 20 See OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (1991); Medina, 505 U.S. at 440. 
 21 Id. § 4241(a). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the defendant must be “presently suffering from a mental disease,” not 
the possibility of suffering.24  With these changes in mind, the defendant 
will be deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial, if, based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, the defendant “is unable to understand 
the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist 
properly in his defense.”25 
Subsequent to a finding of incompetence, the Attorney General 
takes custody of the defendant and determines a suitable facility to treat 
the defendant.26  During a reasonable period of treatment, which may not 
initially exceed four months,27 the defendant is evaluated to determine if 
sufficient capacity exists for the proceedings to continue.28  Once the 
defendant demonstrates the requisite capacity to “understand the nature 
and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly 
in his defense,” the defendant is discharged from treatment and the trial 
is rescheduled on the court’s calendar.29 
A.  Ambiguities Surrounding 18 U.S.C. § 4241 
Although § 4241 provides detailed procedures outlining which 
parties can raise a motion for a mental competency hearing, the 
substantive standards to grant the hearing, and the substantive standards 
to commit the defendant at the conclusion of the hearing, § 4241 and its 
sister sections30 are silent as to which party bears the burden of proof 
during the hearing.  Instead, § 4241 merely states that “[i]f, after the 
hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that the 
defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease,”31 then the 
proceedings against him will be suspended. 
Consequently, because the statutory language fails to indicate 
which party bears the burden of proof, a question arises as to “whether 
the Government bears the burden of establishing competency [of the 
defendant] or the defendant bears the burden of establishing [his] 
incompetency” during the hearing.32  Answering this question becomes 
                                                                                                             
 24 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) with 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). 
 25 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 26 Id. 
 27 A request for an additional reasonable period of time can be made. 18 U.S.C. § 
4241(d)(2). 
 28 Id. § 4241(d)(1). 
 29 Id. § 4241(e). 
 30 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(c) states that “the hearing shall be conducted 
pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(d) [18 U.S.C. § 4247(d)].” 
 31 Id. §4241(d) (emphasis added). 
 32 Patel, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 110. 
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increasingly difficult due to a dearth of legislative history,33 and the 
absence of an on-point United States Supreme Court decision.34  As a 
result, the circuit courts have been left to resolve the allocation of proof. 
B.  The Legislative History of 18 U.S.C. § 4241 
In 1984, after fifteen years of hearings and deliberations,35 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
[hereinafter “CCCA”].36  The CCCA has been deemed “the most radical 
change in federal criminal law in the history of our Nation,”37 resulting 
from Congressional effort to modernize federal criminal law.38  Most 
significantly for the present discussion, the CCCA “completely amended 
chapter 313 of title 18 of the United States Code relating to the procedure 
to be followed by federal courts with respect to offenders who are 
currently suffering from a mental disease or defect.”39  The specific 
portion of the CCCA that amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241–47 is individually 
referred to as the “Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1983” [hereinafter 
“IDRA”].40  However, despite the CCCA’s “radical”41 cumulative 
changes to federal criminal law, the IDRA competency revisions contain 
only slight departures from the pre-amended statutes.42  Instead, the 
IDRA primarily focused on federalizing the insanity defense.43 
Prior to the IDRA, the statute governing mental incompetency was 
18 U.S.C. § 4244.44  Beginning with the differences between pre-
amended § 424445 and the current competency section, § 4241, a 
modification was made as to when the motion to determine competency 
can first be raised: § 4244 allowed a motion to be raised immediately 
after arrest, but § 4241 only permits a motion to be raised after the 
                                                                                                             
 33 Id. at 110, n.33. 
 34 Id. at 110–11 (“The Supreme Court, however, briefly commented on this issue 
[which party bears the burden of proof in a section 4241 mental competency hearing] in 
dicta in Cooper v. Oklahoma.”) (emphasis added). 
 35 KENNETH R. FEINBERG, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 250 
(Practising Law Institute 1985). 
 36 Id. at 249. 
 37 Id. 
 38 United States v. White, 887 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 39 United States v. Nichols, 661 F. Supp. 507, 508 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
 40 Id. at 508. 
 41 See FEINBERG supra note 38, at 249. 
 42 United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 265 n.16 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 43 See infra Part VI.C. 
 44 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949). 
 45 All subsequent references to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 refer to the pre-amended statute 
dealing with competency standards and procedures, not current 18 U.S.C. § 4244, or 
“hospitalization of a convicted person.” 
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commencement of the prosecution.46   Next, although both sections allow 
a psychiatric examination before an actual competency hearing, § 4244 
required the examination, while § 4241 affords judicial discretion.47  
Furthermore, while both sections authorize the court to subsequently 
hold a mental competency hearing where the judge is the trier of fact, 
only § 4241 codifies the standard of proof—a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.48 
Focusing on the similarities between §§ 4244 and 4241, both 
sections indicate, with slightly different language, that mental 
incompetence is the failure of the defendant to comprehend the 
proceedings, or an inability of the defendant to properly assist in his 
defense.49  Additionally, both §§ 4244 and 4241 permit a motion to 
determine mental competency to be raised by the government,50 
defendant’s counsel, or the court.51  Most importantly, both statutes fail 
to explicitly allocate the burden of proof to a specific party to 
demonstrate incompetency or competency during the competency 
hearing.52 
Focusing on the burden of proof, the Senate Report considering the 
IDRA is similarly unsupportive. In fact, the Senate Report merely states 
that “Subsection (d) of section 4241 provides that the court must make a 
determination with respect to the defendant’s competency based upon a 
                                                                                                             
 46 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) (“Whenever after arrest . . .”) with 18 U.S.C. § 
4241 (2006) (“At any time after the commencement of a prosecution . . .”). 
 47 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) (“the court shall. . .”) with 18 U.S.C. § 4241 
(2006) (“the court may . . .”). 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006). 
 49 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) (“so mentally incompetent as to be unable to 
understand the proceedings against him or properly assist in his own defense . . . “) with 
18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006) (“rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is 
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to 
assist properly in his defense.”). 
 50 The 11th Circuit concluded that old § 4244 placed more of an emphasis on the 
Government raising an issue of defendant’s mental state. United States v. Izquierdo, 448 
F.3d 1269, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2006). Even assuming arguendo that the Government had 
a greater obligation to raise an issue of defendant’s mental state, the former § 4244 
nevertheless permitted defendant’s counsel and the court to raise an issue of defendant’s 
mental state as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949). 
 51 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) (If “the United States attorney has reasonable 
cause to believe . . . he shall file a motion . . . . Upon such a motion or upon a similar 
motion in behalf of the accused, or upon its own motion, the court . . .”) with 18 U.S.C. § 
4241(a) (2006) (“[T]he defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion 
for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court shall grant 
the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion . . .”). 
 52 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) with 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006). 
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preponderance of the evidence.”53  Unfortunately, the legislative history 
of competency to stand trial fails to shed light on which party Congress 
intended to bear the burden of proof. 
III.  MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS IN 
MEDINA V. CALIFORNIA AND COOPER V. OKLAHOMA 
There is no binding Supreme Court authority on the federal burden 
of proof for 18 U.S.C. § 4241.54  Medina v. California55 and Cooper v. 
Oklahoma56 are two leading Supreme Court decisions that address the 
constitutionality of California and Oklahoma state laws that require the 
defendant to prove his incompetency.57  This section will distinguish 
both Medina and Cooper, arguing that neither case convincingly 
advocates placing the federal burden of proof in competency hearings on 
the defendant. 
A.  Medina v. California 
Medina presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to assess 
competency requirements under California state law.58  There, Teofilo 
Medina, Jr., armed with a stolen gun, terrorized two gas stations, a food 
market, and dairy.59  At the conclusion of his rampage, Medina had 
murdered three employees of the respective establishments and was 
charged with “three counts of first-degree murder.”60  Concerned with his 
client’s mental state, Medina’s attorney moved for a competency hearing 
pursuant to California state law.61 
California’s controlling statute for a determination of mental 
competency reads: “It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally 
competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
                                                                                                             
 53 United States v. Gigante, 996 F. Supp. 194, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting 
INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF 1984, S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 236 (1983), reprinted in 
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3418). 
 54 See supra note 34. 
 55 505 U.S. 437. 
 56 517 U.S. 348. 
 57 Medina, 505 U.S. at 439 (“The issue in this is case is whether the Due Process 
Clause permits a State [California] to require a defendant who alleges incompetence to 
stand trial to bear the burden of proving so by a preponderance of the evidence.”); 
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 350 (“In Oklahoma the defendant in a criminal prosecution is 
presumed to be competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and 
convincing evidence.”). 
 58 Medina, 505 U.S. at 439 (“The issue in this case is whether the Due Process 
Clause permits a State to require a defendant who alleges incompetence to stand trial to 
bear the burden of proving so by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 439–40. 
 61 Id. 
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defendant is mentally incompetent.”62  California courts have interpreted 
this statute to force the “party claiming incompetence [to] bear[] the 
burden of proving that defendant is incompetent by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”63  Consequently, due to the presumption of competence 
and Medina’s claim of incompetence, Medina bore the burden of proof.  
Despite Medina’s verbal outbursts and overturning of the counsel table, 
the jury determined that Medina did not meet his burden of proof to 
establish incompetence, and the trial proceeded.64  Subsequently, Medina 
was convicted on all three murder charges and sentenced to the death 
penalty.65  After an unsuccessful appeal to the California Supreme Court, 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.66  There, the Court 
affirmed the California Supreme Court, rejecting both Medina’s 
constitutional arguments against a presumption of incompetency and the 
requirement that the defendant must demonstrate his own 
incompetence.67 
In analyzing Medina’s constitutional claim against a defendant 
proving his own incompetence, the Supreme Court borrowed the due 
process framework from Patterson v. New York.68  Similar to Medina, 
Patterson involved a due process challenge against a New York state law 
where the defendant bore the burden of proving an extreme emotional 
disturbance affirmative defense.69  In rejecting the petitioner’s claim, the 
Patterson Court held: 
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is 
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal 
Government . . . and that we should not lightly construe the 
Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by 
the individual states. Among other things, it is normally “within 
the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its 
laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence 
and the burden of persuasion,” and its decision in this regard is 
not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless 
“it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”70 
                                                                                                             
 62 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (West 1982). 
 63 Medina, 505 U.S. at 440. 
 64 Id. at 441. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 442. 
 67 Id. at 441–42. 
 68 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)). 
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Narrowly confining analysis to Patterson, the Court inquired 
whether Medina’s allocation of the burden of proof was “rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people.”71  First, the Court recognized 
Blackstone’s common-law view that an incompetent defendant should 
not be forced to stand trial.72  Next, the Court noted that all fifty states 
have enacted procedures to determine if a defendant is competent to 
stand trial.73  However, analysis of the procedures used by the fifty states 
failed to translate into one uniform position; some states place the burden 
on the party raising the issue, some states place the burden on the 
defendant to prove incompetence, while still others have held that the 
burden rests with the government to demonstrate competency.74  
Consequently, because “there is no settled tradition on the proper 
allocation of the burden of proof in a proceeding to determine 
competence,”75 allocating the burden of proof to the defendant to prove 
incompetence does not “offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental,” as required by Patterson.76  In addition to finding no 
constitutional violation for requiring a defendant to prove his own 
competence, the Court also found no constitutional violation for a 
codified presumption of competence.77 
Immediately, Medina cannot be viewed as persuasive Supreme 
Court authority to place the burden of proof on the defendant for federal 
competency hearings.  Detrimentally, Medina strictly involves California 
state law, and not the federal statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 4241.78  
Moreover, in direct contrast to § 4241, the California state law has 
explicitly codified a presumption of competence, with an interpretation 
that the party claiming incompetence bear the burden of proof.79 
Therefore, Medina is unequivocally a demonstration of the 
Supreme Court adhering to federalist principles.  First, Patterson 
illuminates a non-intrusive or deferential approach to state legislatures.80  
If a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
                                                                                                             
 71 Medina, 505 U.S. at 446. 
 72 Id. at 446. 
 73 Id. at 447. 
 74 Id. at 447–48. 
 75 Id. at 446. 
 76 Medina, 505 U.S. at 446. 
 77 Id. at 453 (“[T]he challenged presumption is a restatement of the burden of proof, 
and it follows from what we have said that the presumption does not violate the Due 
Process Clause.”). 
 78 Id. at 439 
 79 See supra notes 63–64. 
 80 Medina, 505 U.S. at 446 (“The analytical approach endorsed in Patterson is thus 
far less intrusive than that approved in Matthews.”). 
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people”81 existed against a defendant testifying to his own incompetence, 
the federal circuits would not be split, nor would the fifty states take 
various positions on the issue.82  Thus, the analytical approach taken by 
the Supreme Court in Medina was not a heightened threshold for the 
California law to satisfy.  Second, this deferential approach gives reason 
to believe that variation in the California law would similarly pass 
constitutional muster.  For example, if the California law did not codify a 
presumption of competence but instead explicitly allocated the burden of 
proof to the government, the Supreme Court would again defer to the 
state legislature.  This conclusion results from two circumstances: first, 
the Medina Court conceded that “there is no settled tradition on the 
proper allocation of the burden of proof in a proceeding to determine 
competence;”83 and second, the Court acknowledged that states have 
“considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and criminal 
process.” 84  As a result, the Supreme Court in Medina was solely 
concerned with the constitutional adequacy of California state law, and 
the Court’s analysis cannot thereby be imputed to federal competency 
standards.85 
B.  Cooper v. Oklahoma 
Approximately four years after Medina,86 the United States 
Supreme Court was once more called upon to interpret state law 
competency standards in Cooper v. Oklahoma.87  Cooper involved the 
defendant’s murdering of an eighty-six-year-old man during a burglary.88  
As in Medina, Cooper’s attorney raised the issue of his client’s 
incompetency before trial.89  However, Cooper’s incompetency remained 
in question throughout the duration of the proceedings, as questions 
surrounding his competence were raised on five separate occasions.90  
Evidence of defendant’s incompetence included his belief that clothes 
                                                                                                             
 81 Id. 
 82 See infra Parts IV, V. 
 83 Medina, 505 U.S. at 446. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. at 453 (“Rather, our rejection of petitioner’s challenge to § 1369(f) is based 
on a determination that California procedure is ‘constitutionally adequate’ to guard 
against such results.”). 
 86 Compare Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) with Cooper v. Oklahoma, 
517 U.S. 348 (1996). 
 87 517 U.S. 348, 350 (1996). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 351. 
 90 Id. at 350 (“On five separate occasions a judge considered whether petitioner 
[Cooper] has the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense 
counsel.”). 
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selected for him to wear during trial were burning him, an imaginary 
spirit was counseling him, and that his defense attorney wanted to kill 
him.91  Despite this testimony, the Court repeatedly found that Cooper 
was competent to stand trial.92  Expressing his reluctance, the trial judge 
stated: “My shirtsleeve opinion of Mr. Cooper is that he’s not normal. 
Now, to say he’s not competent is something else.”93 
The contradiction between the trial judge’s statement and his 
decision to find the defendant competent to stand trial rested with 
Oklahoma’s competency statute.  Similar to California’s mental 
competency statute, Oklahoma codified a presumption of competence.94  
However, a defendant in Oklahoma had the burden of proving his 
incompetence95 by the heightened standard of clear and convincing 
evidence, not the “more likely than not” standard of the preponderance of 
the evidence in California. 96 
On appeal, the Court considered “whether a State may proceed with 
a criminal trial after the defendant has demonstrated that he is more 
likely than not incompetent.”97  The Court noted that, “we are aware of 
no decisional law from this country suggesting that any State employed 
Oklahoma’s heightened standard until quite recently.”98  Moreover, the 
Court noted that only four of the fifty states require a defendant to prove 
incompetence by the clear and convincing standard.99  To accentuate that 
courts have not embraced the clear and convincing burden of proof when 
determining incompetence, the Court looked towards 18 U.S.C. § 4241 
and stated: “The situation is no different in federal court. Congress has 
directed that the accused in a federal prosecution must prove 
incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.”100 
Any subsequent reliance on the Court’s statement in Cooper 
regarding the federal burden of proof is misplaced.  First, the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 91 Id. at 351–52 n.1. 
 92 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 352 (1996). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1369(f) (“It shall be presumed that the 
defendant is mentally competent. . . .”) with OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (1991) 
(“[The defendant] shall be presumed to be competent [to stand trial.]”) 
 95 OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (1991) (“[The defendant] shall be presumed to be 
competent for the purpose of the allocation of the burden of proof and burden of going 
forward with the evidence.”) (emphasis added). 
 96 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1369(f) (“unless it is proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.”) with OKLA 
STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (1991) (“The court, at the hearing on the application, shall 
determine, by clear and convincing evidence, if the person is incompetent.”). 
 97 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355. 
 98 Id. at 359. 
 99 Id. at 360. 
 100 Id. at 361–62 (emphasis added). 
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Court’s statement is unconvincing because it is obiter dictum, or that 
“said in passing.”“101  Cooper’s appeal to the Supreme Court challenged 
the constitutionality of the heightened clear and convincing evidence 
standard that Oklahoma codified as necessary to prove incompetency.102  
Concluding that the clear and convincing standard violated due 
process,103 the Court conducted a survey of what standard of proof 
Oklahoma’s sister states had enacted.104  After determining that only four 
of the fifty states required clear and convincing evidence,105 the Court 
further noted that the federal competency statute only required a 
preponderance of the evidence.106  Drawing upon the federal competency 
statute served as a corollary to the permissible constitutional standard of 
proof—not a discussion of which party should bear that burden.  In fact, 
unlike Medina, Cooper never established that requiring a defendant to 
prove his own incompetence, regardless of the standard of proof, violates 
the Due Process Clause.  Hence, “this language from Cooper is dict[um] 
because the case dealt with state burdens of proof in competency 
hearings, not with the federal statutes establishing the standards and 
procedures for competency hearings in federal court.”107 
Second, although in certain instances Supreme Court dictum can be 
authoritative,108 this is not one of those occasions.  To determine the 
weight given to dictum, the inquiry focuses on the “character of the 
dictum.”109  Obiter dictum, which carries light weight, is “[a] judicial 
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is 
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.”110  
Conversely, if the Supreme Court’s dictum is considered “of recent 
vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement,” it can bind 
federal circuit courts.111  The Supreme Court’s statement in Cooper must 
be categorized as unpersuasive and non-influential obiter dictum.  The 
District of Arizona appropriately summarized this conclusion by 
recognizing that the Supreme Court in Cooper failed to scrutinize or 
                                                                                                             
 101 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009). 
 102 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 350. 
 103 Id. at 362. 
 104 Id. at 359. 
 105 Id. at 360. 
 106 Id. at 360–62. 
 107 United States v. Sanchez, 38 F.Supp. 2d 355, 368 (D.N.J. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 108 Patel, 524 F.Supp.2d at 111. 
 109 McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRACTICE § 58 (4th ed. 1983). 
 110 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009). 
 111 McCoy, 950 F.2d at 19. 
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evaluate the federal competency statute.112  In short, the Supreme Court’s 
assertion that “Congress has directed that the accused in a federal 
prosecution must prove his incompetence”113 was incidental to the broad 
comparison of Oklahoma’s standard of proof to the remaining forty-nine 
states. 
Therefore, neither Medina nor Cooper provides an appropriate 
foundation for concluding that the federal burden of proof for 
competency hearings rests with the defendant.  First, the Supreme Court 
did not grant certiorari in Medina and Cooper to address the 
constitutionality of the federal competency statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4241.114  
On the contrary, the only reviewed statutes were state statutes of 
California and Oklahoma.115  Moreover, these state statutes are distinct 
from 18 U.S.C. § 4241, as both the California and Oklahoma statutes 
codified a presumption of competence116 and established the allocation of 
the burden of proof to one party.117  Second, the deferential review 
exhibited in Medina118 is inappropriate for determining which party bears 
the federal burden of proof when there is an absence of delegation.  
Finally, Cooper’s one sentence reference to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 served one 
narrow purpose: to strengthen the Court’s position that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard of proving incompetence is not customary 
practice in the American court system.119  Accordingly, the answer to 
which party bears the federal burden of proof cannot be found in 
Supreme Court precedent. 
IV. THE CIRCUITS’ ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE WHICH PARTY BEARS THE 
FEDERAL BURDEN OF PROOF 
Due to the lack of statutory placement,120 unsupportive legislative 
history,121 and no binding United States Supreme Court decision,122 the 
circuits that have addressed the issue are split as to which party bears the 
burden of proof.123 
                                                                                                             
 112 United States v. Dodds, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251 at *2 n.1 (D.Az. Mar. 24, 
2006). 
 113 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362. 
 114 Medina, 505 U.S. at 439. 
 115 See Id. at 445; Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362. 
 116 See supra note 95. 
 117 Medina, 505 U.S. at 440. See supra note 96. 
 118 See supra Part III.A. 
 119 See supra note 100. 
 120 See supra Part II.A. 
 121 See supra Part II.B. 
 122 See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 123 Patel, 24 F.Supp. 2d at 112. 
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The Third,124 Fifth,125 and Ninth126 Circuits have explicitly placed 
the burden of proof on the government to demonstrate the defendant’s 
competence.  Referencing simple logic, the Third Circuit stated that “it 
would be both basically unfair as well as contradictory to say that a 
defendant who claims he is incompetent should be presumed to have the 
mental capacity to show that he in fact is incompetent.”127  In contrast, 
the Fourth128 and Eleventh129 Circuits place the burden of proof on the 
defendant to prove his incompetence.  Unlike the Third Circuit, neither 
the Fourth nor Eleventh Circuits offer any analytical reasoning for their 
decisions.  Instead, both Circuits merely reference130 Supreme Court 
dictum in Cooper v. Oklahoma that “in [a] federal prosecution [the 
defendant] must prove incompetence. . . .”131 
Besides the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the 
remaining circuits have either not officially considered the burden of 
proof issue,132 declined to address the issue, 133 or struggled with an intra-
circuit split.134 
                                                                                                             
 124 United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1089 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Hollins, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 986-
88 (3d Cir. 1976). Although Hollins and DiGilio are pre-1984, and thus pre-CCCA, for 
the purposes of this comment old § 4244 is the functional equivalent of current § 4241 as 
the burden of proof was not allocated in old § 4244. See supra Part II.B. 
 125 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Makris, 
535 F.2d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 1976). Although Makris is pre-1984, and thus pre-CCCA, for 
the purposes of this comment old § 4244 is the functional equivalent of current § 4241 as 
the burden of proof was not allocated in old § 4244. See supra Part II.B. 
 126 United States v. Hoskie, 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 127 Hollins, 569 F.2d at 205. 
 128 United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 129 Izquierdo, 448 F.3d at 1278. 
 130 Robinson, 404 F.3d at 856 (citing Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362); Izquierdo, 448 F.3d at 
1277 (citing Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362). 
 131 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362. 
 132 See United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, 109 Fed. Appx. 287, 290 (10th Cir. Sept. 
9, 2004) (unpublished Tenth Circuit case relying on Cooper to establish that the 
defendant bears the burden of proving incompetence); United States v. Siders, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3780, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 17, 2008) (unpublished district court case within 
the Eight Circuit relying on a Seventh Circuit case to establish that the government bears 
the burden of proving competency); Patel, 524 F.Supp.2d at 110 (“[T]he First Circuit 
does not appear to have considered the burden of proof issue.”); United States v. Hoyt, 
200 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (relying on an unpublished Sixth Circuit 
case, United States v. Chapple, 47 F.3d 1170 (6th Cir. 1995)  to establish that the 
government bears the burden of proving competence); United States v. Rudisill, 43 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999) (relying on Cooper to establish that the defendant bears the 
burden of proving incompetence). 
 133 See United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The federal statute 
providing for competency hearings does not allocate the burden of proof, and neither the 
Supreme Court nor this Court has decided as a matter of statutory construction whether 
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V. THE STATES’ ATTEMPTS TO ALLOCATE THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
STATE COMPETENCY HEARINGS 
The dispute over which party bears the burden of proof in 
competency hearings is not limited to the federal circuit courts but is also 
prevalent in state legislators and state courts.  A current survey of the 
states affirms the Court’s recognition in Medina, over seventeen years 
ago,135 that there is “no settled tradition” among the states regarding 
which party bears the burden of proof in state competency hearings.136 
Beginning with states that allocate the burden of proof to the 
criminal defendant, Oklahoma is the only state that has codified such 
placement.137  The remaining eleven states that force the defendant to 
bear the burden of proving his incompetence have done so through 
common-law creation.138 
                                                                                                             
the government or defendant bears the burden. We decline, however, to reach this issue 
today.”). 
 134 Compare United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1373 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The 
starting point in all this is the notion that a criminal defendant is presumed to be 
competent to stand trial and bears the burden of proving otherwise.”) with United States 
v. Teague, 956 F.2d 1427, 1432 n.10 (7th Cir. 1992) (“We note that once the issue of the 
defendant’s mental competency is raised, the government bears the burden of proving 
that the defendant is competent to stand trial.”). 
 135 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992). 
 136 See Id. at 446. 
 137 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (2009). 
 138 See Lackey v. State, 615 So. 2d 145, 151–52 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (“The 
defendant bears the initial burden . . .”); Lipscomb v. State, 609 S.W.2d 15, 17 (1980) 
(“There is a presumption of competence to stand trial, and the burden of proof of 
incompetence is on the defendant.”); Johnson v. State, 433 S.E.2d 717, 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1993) (“The burden was upon defendant to show incompetency by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”); State v. Holmes, 5 So. 3d 42, 55 (La. 2008) (“Thus, the burden is upon 
the accused to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the mental incapacity 
exists.”); State v. Hansen, 174 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1970); Emanuel v. State, 412 So. 
2d. 1187, 1888 (Miss. 1982) (“It naturally devolves upon the defendant to go forward 
with the evidence to show his probable incapacity to make a rational defense.”); State v. 
Chapman, 721 P.2d 392, 395 (N.M. 1986) (“This Court has previously determined that 
there is no impropriety in requiring an accused to carry this burden [of proving his 
incompetence to stand trial].”); States v. Gates, 309 S.E.2d 498, 502 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) 
(“Defendant has the burden of persuasion with respect to establishing his incapacity.”); 
McLaughlin v. State, 575 S.E.2d 841, 843 (S.C. 2003) (“The defendant bears the burden 
of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.”); State v. Reid, 164 
S.W.3d 286, 306–07 (Tenn. 2005) (“The burden of establishing incompetence to stand 
trial rests with the defendant.”); Jackson v. State, 857 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. App. 1993) 
(“An accused is presumed competent unless she proves her incompetence to stand trial by 
a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
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Conversely, Illinois,139 South Dakota,140 and Wisconsin141 have 
each codified the requirement that the state is required to prove 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Six states, through judicial 
decree, share the opinions of Illinois, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.142  
Cumulatively, twenty-one states have allocated the burden of proof 
through codification or common-law. 
Two options remain in those states where the burden of proof has 
not been allocated.  First, states have elected to place the burden of proof 
on the party raising the issue of competency.  Nine states143 have reached 
this position through statutory creation, while four states144 have reached 
                                                                                                             
 139 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-11(c) (LexisNexis 2009) (“[T]he burden of 
proving that the defendant is fit by a preponderance of the evidence and the burden of 
going forward with the evidence are on the State.”). 
 140 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-10A-6.1 (2009) (“If the defendant, state, or court 
asserts that a defendant is mentally incompetent to proceed, the state has the burden of 
proving the mental competence of the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 141 WISC. STAT. § 971.14(4)(b) (2009) (“If the defendant stands mute or claims to be 
incompetent, the defendant shall be found incompetent unless the state proves by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence that the defendant is competent.”). 
 142 See Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863 (Del. 1986) (“The prosecution must prove the 
defendant’s competence by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Commonwealth v. 
Crowley, 471 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Mass. 1984) (“The prosecution bears the burden of proof 
of competency once the issue has been raised by the parties or by the judge on his own 
motion.”); State v. Zorzy, 622 A.2d 1217, 1219 (N.H. 1993) (“The State has the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant is competent to stand 
trial.”); State v. Lambert, 645 A.2d 1189, 1191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“Once a 
defendant raises a bona fide doubt as to competency, the burden rests with the State to 
establish competency to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence.”); People v. 
Santos, 349 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (“[W]hen the issue of mental 
competence to stand trial is properly raised the People are only required to establish that 
competence by a preponderance of the evidence.”); State v. Heger, 326 N.W.2d 855, 858 
(N.D. 1982) (“[T]he prosecution has the burden to establish a defendant’s capacity to 
stand trial.”); 
 143 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.100(c) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8.5-103(7) 
(2009); CONN GEN. STAT. § 54-56d(b) (2008); IOWA CODE § 812.3 (2008); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 552.020(8) (2009); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7403(a) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-
5.3-3(b) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-5(10) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(E) 
(2009). 
 144 See Medina v. California, 506 U.S. 437, 440 (1992) (California courts have 
interpreted their competency statute to force the “party claiming incompetence [to] bear[] 
the burden of proving that defendant is incompetent by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”); State v. Barnes, 948 P.2d 627, 637 (Kan. 1997) (the Kansas statute 
“implicitly contains a . . . burden of proof imposed on the party raising the competency 
issue.”); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ohio 2002) (“Thus, one who challenges 
the presumption of sanity or competence must bear the burden of proof to challenge that 
presumption.”); Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Wyo. 1989) (“[T]he burden of 
proof by a preponderance of evidence rests on the party seeking to establish that the 
accused is competent.”). 
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the same conclusion through their courts.  Second, the residual states145 
have left the determination of competency as a discretionary matter to 
the courts. 
At best, a survey of the states illustrates a lack of uniformity.  
Similar to the inquiry behind the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 4241 
and Supreme Court analysis, the approaches taken by the states provides 
little guidance in allocating the federal burden proof in competency 
hearings. 
VI. THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS OF 18 U.S.C. § 4241 REQUIRE 
PLACEMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE GOVERNMENT 
Despite the lack of legislative history, non-binding Supreme Court 
authority, and debate in the state courts and the federal circuit courts, the 
proper allocation of the federal burden of proof is nonetheless 
determinable.  Pursuant to § 4241, a motion to conduct a mental 
competency hearing146 and the ultimate decision to commit the defendant 
for treatment147 are predicated on two concerns: the defendant’s inability 
to “understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against 
him” or inability to “assist properly in his defense.”148  These two factors 
in § 4241 demonstrate that Congress was concerned with the defendant’s 
ability to furnish his counsel with evidence adducing his mental state, the 
risk of error if the defendant was forced to bear the burden of proof, and 
the overall fundamental fairness to the adversary system.  These three 
considerations—access to evidence, risk of error, and fundamental 
fairness—collectively demonstrate that the government must bear the 
burden of proving competence in federal competency hearings. 
                                                                                                             
 145 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4510 (LexisNexis 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-
405 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-212(1) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-B 
(2009); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM PROC. § 3-104 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
330.2020 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
178.415(4) (LexisNexis 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.370(1) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 4822(a) (2009); W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 27-6A-3(c) (LexisNexis 2009); Flowers v. 
State, 353 So. 2d 1259, 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (“The matter is one simply 
submitted to the conscience of the trial judge.”); Wallace v. Indiana, 486 N.E.2d 445, 454 
(Ind. 1985) (“[T]he only burden which exists rests on the trial judge to satisfy himself 
that the accused is or is not competent to stand trial.”); Commonwealth v. Wooten, 269 
S.W.3d 857, 863 (Ky. 2008) (“The trial court makes the ultimate determination of 
whether a defendant is competent to stand trial.”); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb. App. 776, 787 
(Neb. Ct. App. 1996) (“Competency to stand trial is a factual determination and the 
means to be employed to determine competency are discretionary with the district 
court.”). 
 146 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006). 
 147 Id. § 4241(d) 
 148 Id. §§ 4241(a); 4241(d). 
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A.  Access to Evidence 
A categorical statement asserting that defense counsel has the 
greatest access to evidence to prove his client’s incompetence must be 
dismissed.  At first glance, this may challenge logic—if the defense 
counsel cannot prove the incompetence of its own client,149 how is the 
government in a better position to present evidence of the defendant’s 
competence?  The answer is rooted in the principle that psychiatric 
experts and prison personnel, not lawyers, are the most persuasive 
individuals in establishing or disproving competency for the trier of 
fact.150 
A lawyer’s input regarding his client’s mental state is not an 
appropriate avenue for the court.  First, ethical responsibilities or 
attorney-client privilege may serve as preemptive obstacles against an 
attorney testifying to his client’s competency.151  Second, even if an 
attorney were to testify, his testimony “is far more likely to be 
discounted by the fact-finder as self-interested and biased” when 
compared to that of a medical specialist.152  Thus, a lawyer’s testimony 
serves little probative value,153 as “competency determinations have been 
virtually delegated to mental health professionals, whose opinions are 
given little scrutiny by the courts.  Often, courts are given little or no 
additional information for judging the competency of a defendant.”154  In 
fact, it has been documented that mental health professional 
recommendations have a judicial acceptance rate of ninety percent.155 
In a Medina concurrence, Justice O’Connor recognized the 
significant role mental health professionals play in the competency 
determination but cautioned that “[i]f the burden of proving competence 
rests on the government, a defendant will have less incentive to 
cooperate in psychiatric investigations, because an inconclusive 
                                                                                                             
 149 Medina, 450 U.S. at 450. 
 150 Id. at 465-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 151 Id.; see also James A. Cohen, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules, and the 
Impaired Criminal Defendant, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529, 556 (1998) (“It is not the 
lawyer’s function to impose her view of what is in the client’s best interest. The agency 
relationship requires a principal who is competent; the attorney, therefore, is not 
authorized to act when she has a reasonable belief that the principal is incompetent.”). 
 152 Medina, 505 U.S. at 466 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 153 Id. at 455-56 (The “lawyer’s view will likely have no outlet in, or effect on, the 
competency determination.”). 
 154 Cohen, supra note 151, at 544. 
 155 Medina, 505 U.S. at 465 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Grant Morris et al., 
Health Law in the Criminal Justice Symposium: Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193, 199 n.28 (2004) (noting a ninety percent concurrence 
rate between judges and mental health evaluators). 
184 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 6:165 
examination will benefit the defense, not the prosecution.”156  Justice 
O’Connor’s concern is misplaced because prison personnel can 
supplement mental health professionals’ recommendations and there is 
no federal presumption of competency. 
In dissent, Justice Blackmun stressed the importance of prison 
personnel testimony when a psychiatric investigation may not be 
sufficient.157  In Medina, the criminal defendant was held in jail for a 
period exceeding one year prior to his competency hearing.158  During 
the time immediately preceding the competency hearing, Medina was 
placed in a padded cell for observation.159  As a result, prison personnel 
had the opportunity to survey Medina’s behavior in reoccurring fifteen-
minute intervals.160  Therefore, prison personnel had the opportunity to 
neutrally observe a defendant’s behavior before psychiatric examinations 
were even conducted.  The importance of this surveillance cannot be 
minimized; if a defendant exhibits certain behavior with a psychiatrist 
but displays the near opposite conduct while incarcerated—whether in 
situations like Medina’s or in the standard incarceration setting—prison 
personnel can testify to any discrepancies at the competency hearing. 
Moreover, concerns regarding improper motives are not sufficiently 
compelling when no federal presumption of competency has been 
codified.  The suggestion that a “defendant will have less incentive to 
cooperate”161  when the government bears the burden of establishing 
competency makes two assumptions: (1) the defendant is competent, as 
the California state law in Medina and Oklahoma state law in Cooper 
dictate;162 and (2) the competent defendant mischievously comports his 
behavior to portray incompetence solely for the purpose of delaying the 
criminal trial.  The first assumption is detrimental, as accepting this line 
of reasoning would require the federal courts to assume a crucial 
precondition not delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 4241.   By not recognizing a 
presumption of competence, the federal statute thereby places all 
defendants, whether truly incompetent or not, on uniform grounds.  Thus, 
federal concern over deceit is adequately addressed through the trier of 
fact’s determination of competency from expert medical and prison 
personnel testimony, based on a preponderance of the evidence. 
                                                                                                             
 156 Medina, 505 U.S. at 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 157 Id. at 465 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See supra note 95. 
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B.  Risk of Error 
The substantive standards of 18 U.S.C. § 4241—the defendant’s 
inability to “understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings 
against him” or to “assist properly in his defense”163—demonstrate that 
Congress was gravely concerned with improperly forcing the defendant 
to bear the risk of error.  As the defendant’s interest against an erroneous 
conclusion outweighs any burden the state may face in postponing the 
trial,164 the government must accordingly bear the federal burden of 
proving defendant’s competence. 
At the conclusion of a mental competency hearing, if the judge 
declares a defendant mentally competent to understand the proceedings 
against him and assist his attorney in his defense,165 then the trial 
proceeds as scheduled.  However, if the defendant fails to meet the 
threshold requirements of competency, the trial is merely postponed.166  
The trial is not postponed indefinitely, but for a “reasonable period of 
time, not to exceed four months” in order for the defendant to receive 
treatment to regain competence.167  As a result, by placing the risk of 
error on the government, the government’s inability to establish 
competency will not have prejudicial effects on the government; neither 
the merits nor the facts of the case change.  Accordingly: 
[T]here is comparatively little harm in mistakenly finding a 
defendant incompetent, for he will simply be sent to a state 
mental health hospital until found sane and then re-tried. In other 
words, an erroneous finding of incompetency will do little more 
than postpone the trial. Although somewhat burdensome to the 
state, this is far less costly than convicting a defendant unable to 
assist in or understand his defense.168 
In Medina, the Court noted that “the allocation of the burden of 
proof to the defendant will affect competency determinations only in a 
narrow class of cases where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where 
the evidence that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the 
evidence that he is incompetent.”169  Under that scenario, the court’s 
                                                                                                             
 163 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); Id. § 4241(d). 
 164 See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 365. 
 165 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). 
 166 Id. § 4241(d). 
 167 Id. § 4241(d). The reasonable period of time can be extended beyond four months 
if the defendant’s condition has not improved, or the government drops the charges 
against him. Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A)–(B). 
 168 Alaya B. Meyes, Supreme Court Review: Rejecting the Clear and Convincing 
Evidence Standard for Proof of Incompetence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1016, 1039 
(1996) (emphasis added). 
 169 Medina, 505 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). 
186 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 6:165 
finding is directly related to the party bearing the burden of proof.  For 
example, in Medina the defendant bore the burden of proving his 
incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.170  At the conclusion 
of the competency hearing, had the evidence been in equipoise, Medina 
would have failed to meet his burden of proof.  As a result, the trial 
would have proceeded, despite the possibility that the defendant may 
have been incompetent. In such a “narrow class of cases,”171 the 
defendant should not be faulted because the evidence is in equipoise.  
Forcing a potentially incompetent defendant to be tried creates a greater 
societal harm than the added financial expense of hospitalizing a 
competent defendant for “a reasonable period of time.”172  As a result, 
cases in equipoise amplify the need for the government to bear the risk of 
error. 
C.  Risk of Error and a Comparison to the Insanity Defense  
Prior to the enactment of the CCCA, the federal defense of insanity 
was a federal common-law creation.173  Accordingly, “[u]nder federal 
common law, the government had the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the 
offense.”174  This practice reached its pinnacle in 1984 after John 
Hinckley, Jr. was acquitted for his plot to assassinate then-President 
Ronald Regan, as the government failed to establish Hinckley’s sanity.175   
The public was outraged with the acquittal as “[n]ewspapers and 
television commentators almost unanimously condemned both the 
verdict and the law that permitted it” and “[n]umerous political figures, 
including Attorney General Smith and President Reagan, issue[d] 
statements” attacking the jury’s finding.176  Thus, Hinckley’s acquittal 
served as a catalyst for Congress to drastically reform the insanity 
defense through the IDRA.177  The IDRA created a special verdict if the 
defense of insanity was raised—”not guilty only by reason of 
                                                                                                             
 170 Id. at 440 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1369(f) (West 1982)). 
 171 Id. 
 172 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). 
 173 Rick L. Sorensen, Shannon v. United States: Supreme Court Determines Whether 
Federal Courts Should Instruct Juries on the Consequences of a Not Guilty by Reason of 
Insanity Verdict, 21. J. CONTEMP. L. 365, 369 (1995). 
 174 Id. (emphasis added). 
 175 Shari N. Spitz, Psychiatric and Psychological Examination for Sentencing: An 
Analysis of Caselaw form the Second Circuit in Comparison with Other Federal Circuits 
and the Governing Federal Statutes, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 133, 137 (2003). 
 176 Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both 
Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the 
Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. REV. 943, 946–47 (1987). 
 177 Sorensen, supra note 173 at 370. 
2009] PROVING INCOMPETENCE 187 
insanity.”178  This verdict could now only be reached if the defendant 
proved his insanity through clear and convincing evidence.179 
Congressional response to the Hinckley acquittal has two influential 
effects on the risk of error analysis for 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  First, the 
IDRA’s explicit allocation of the burden of proof to defendant when 
raising the insanity defense demonstrates that Congress, if warranted, 
will explicitly place the burden of proof on the defendant.  In direct 
contrast, when amending former § 4244 to current § 4241, Congress 
could have similarly placed the burden of proof on the defendant but 
chose not to do so.  As a result, placing the risk of error on the 
government to establish the defendant’s competency under 18 U.S.C. § 
4241 does not offend Congressional intent.  Second, allocating the risk or 
error to the government for federal competency hearings is plainly 
distinct from the pre-CCCA common law insanity defense.  Forcing the 
government to establish sanity beyond a reasonable doubt was simply an 
“untenable position” for the government to maintain.180  After Hinckley’s 
acquittal, “interviews with the jurors . . . suggested that this burden of 
proof was a critical factor in their decision to find Hin[c]kley not guilty. . 
. . This suggests that if the burden of proof had been on Hin[c]kley, the 
jury would have produced a different result.”181  In direct comparison, 
allocating the risk of the loss to the government in a federal competency 
hearing, based on the less demanding preponderance of the evidence 
standard, will not result in an unworkable standard for the government.  
Moreover, forcing the government to bear the risk of error on 
competency will merely result in the trial’s delay,182 while failure to 
satisfy the pre-CCCA standard will terminate the trial.183  Accordingly, 
the lower standard of proof and ultimate consequences of failing to meet 
that standard act as mitigating factors to opponents of placing the burden 
of proof on the government for federal competency hearings. 
D.  Fundamental Fairness 
The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly allocated the 
burden of proof to the government to establish defendant’s competence, 
while the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have forced the defendant to bear 
the burden of proving his incompetence.184  Analysis of these circuits’ 
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decisions conclusively demonstrates that placing the burden of proof on 
the government to establish a defendant’s incompetence most accurately 
upholds notions of fundamental fairness. 
The Third Circuit, one of the three circuits that place the burden of 
proof on the Government to establish competence, proffered discussion 
of fundamental fairness in its reasoning.  Specifically, the Third Circuit 
concluded that “[i]t is equally contradictory to argue that a defendant 
who may be incompetent should be presumed to possess sufficient 
intelligence that he will be able to adduce evidence of his incompetency 
which might otherwise be within his grasp.”185  In other words, forcing 
the person whose incompetence is in question to prove his incompetence 
is “both basically unfair as well as contradictory.”186  The Third Circuit’s 
recognition that placing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove his 
competence is amplified by the traditional reluctance of the courts “to 
require a party to prove negatives.”187 
Unfortunately, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits offer no descriptive 
analysis to rebut the Third Circuit.  Instead, both the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits quickly dispose of any analysis or original contemplation by 
mechanically deferring to Cooper as their controlling authority.188  The 
reference of a non-binding Supreme Court opinion that referred to the 
federal incompetency statute in obiter dictum, without more, fails to 
illustrate why subsequent adherence to Fourth and Eleventh Circuits 
must follow.  Based on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit’s indifference, 
the Third Circuit’s logical reasoning is the final consideration to demand 
that the government must bear the federal burden of proving a criminal 
defendant’s incompetence. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If confronted with the 18 U.S.C. § 4241 circuit split, the Supreme 
Court will have the opportunity to craft a decision from a clean slate. 
Without prior precedent, the Supreme Court is not strictly constrained to 
implement a decision that is deferential189 or merely “adequate.”190  
Instead, by analyzing the substantive standards of the statute, the Court 
can more easily consider the role of access to evidence, risk of error, and 
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fundamental fairness.191  These considerations overwhelmingly illustrate 
that a criminal defendant cannot be required to demonstrate his own 
incompetence, warranting a departure from Cooper’s dictum.192 
This approach is consistent with legislative intent.  Although one 
may wonder how legislative intent can be inferred without a detailed 
Senate Report,193 the answer goes beyond the congressional debate 
surrounding the CCCA reform.  In its place, advocates of criminal 
defendants’ rights need not look further than the initial principles 
announced by Blackstone, furthered by the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and later reinforced by Chief Justice Burger’s assertion in 
Drope v. Missouri.194  With these factors in mind, the question becomes: 
how can one argue that a defendant is required to prove his own 
incompetence to stand trial when “[t]he legal doctrine against the trial of 
an incompetent defendant is firmly rooted in English and American legal 
history[?]”195 The answer is: one cannot. 
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